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1 Introduction
There has been a resurgence of interest in multidimensional social evaluation
functions mainly due to new techniques that extend in the multidimensional set-
ting the pioneering works by Atkinson (1970; 1987), Kolm (1976a;b; 1977) and
Sen (1976). In particular, Tsui (1995; 1999) and Gajdos and Weymark (2005)
have offered axiomatic approaches to designing income inequality measures in
a multiattribute context.
Although Tsui mainly used the additive approach, Gajdos and Weymark
built upon the generalized Gini social function. These two different approaches
are not at all innocuous. The former aggregates the attributes of each individual
and then additively aggregates the resulting values; the latter evaluates the
different attributes through a specific aggregation and then simply aggregates
the values.
Note also that although Tsui’s (1999) approach is a ‘traditional’ additive
evaluation, Gajdos and Weymark (2005) adopted a non-additive approach,
which was introduced by Weymark in his seminal paper in 1981.
In this paper, we follow the traditional additive approach, but instead of im-
posing the majorization theory of the m-dimensional case as in Tsui (1995), we
confine ourselves to accommodating a particular Pigou-Dalton transfer, which
we believe is relevant. Furthermore our approach is consistent with the mean-
ingful property of correlation increasing majorization (e.g. Tsui, 1999).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the related literature.
Section 3 presents our motivations. Section 4 states the framework and the
axioms. Section 5 offers our main Theorem, specifically the Theorem 2 which
characterizes our social evaluation function. Section 6 aims at reducing the num-
ber of parameters, namely, at specifying some fundamental ψ function, for our
purpose. Thus we deliver a tractable relative inequality index in the Corollary
of Theorem 3. Section 7 shows that our evaluation function can accommodate
correlation increasing majorization. Section 8 evaluates the appliance of our
inframodular social evaluation, by comparing it with the famous Human De-
velopment Index (HDI) by using effective data. Section 9 concludes and proofs
can be found in the Annex.
2 Related literature
In the last two decades, consensus has been emerging among many scientists,
particularly economists, about the multidimensional aspect of individual well-
being that cannot be reduced to a unique monetary dimension. The origin of
the multidimensional approach to poverty and/or inequality can be traced to
the works of Rawls and Sen on ethical principles. In this perspective, as an ex-
ample, health and education are important dimensions of individual well-being
to be considered along with income. Crucially, many additional aspects of well-
being may not be compared on a true cardinal basis; nonetheless, the literature
assumes that all attributes have a cardinal meaning (Allison and Foster, 2004).
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Unidimensional methods of evaluating poverty and inequality are applied when
a single well-defined dimensional variable, i.e., income, has been selected. The
selected variable can be cardinal, more often, or ordinal, and in this unidimen-
sional environment, rank is defined regarding the minimum level, named the
poverty line, below which a person is considered poor. If the assumed notion
of poverty (inequality) is considered a useful proxy (unidimensional lens) that
emerges after taking into account (and merging) different dimensions, then a
unidimensional methodology is coherent and consistent.
On the contrary, if an aggregate variable cannot be constructed because
there is a set of non-cardinal and non-summable attributes (health, education,
talent, capabilities, etc.) in addition to income or consumption, then identifi-
cation and measurement problems emerge. Identification means, for example,
that is necessary to define the conditions under which a person is considered
poor, and a measure must evaluate how much poverty there is overall (Sen,
1976). Poverty and inequality, like development, are multidimensional. In the
economic literature, for ranking individuals who differ in attributes, there are
two main approaches: The first uses a social welfare function (i.e. Atkinson
and Bourguignon, 1982); the second extends the Foster et al. (1984) class of in-
dices (decomposable poverty measures based on powers of normalized shortfalls)
by using inequality statistics and measuring individual attributes with a utility
function, so that the resulting univariate distribution vector of utilities is valued
through an inequality index. Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) attach to the
attributes a symmetrical role; in fact, they introduce the crucial idea of comple-
mentarity or substitutability between attributes, which may be expressed as a
social taste either for increasing correlation or for decreasing correlation. They
study the correspondence between stochastic dominance conditions and the wel-
fare interpretation of the value judgments. Interesting enough, comparing dis-
tributions according either to an additive separable social welfare function with
concave utilities or to the sequence of Pigou–Dalton progressive transfers leads
to the same conclusion as resorting to Lorenz curves or computing the amount
of aggregate poverty gaps. In a seminal paper, Maasoumi (1986) introduces a
two-stage approach for defining the class of generalized entropy measures.
More interesting for our research, in 1995 Tsui introduces a multidimen-
sional generalization of the Atkinson-Kolm-Sen approach to measure inequality.
Tsui defines a set of axioms “which are generalizations of their counterparts in
the unidimensional context and are often considered to have a higher degree
of acceptability.” (1995; p. 254). In this way, he distinguishes absolute and
relative multidimensional equality indices based on a social evaluation function.
Gajdos and Weymark (2005) follow Tsui’s general approach and obtain an uni-
variate distribution vector of utilities that is valued using an inequality index.
In particular, Gajdos and Weymark extend generalized Gini social evaluation
functions to the multivariate case with a comonotonic independence axiom, such
that “two allocations are said to be comonotonic if all individuals are ranked
identically in all attributes (i.e., the richest is also the most educated etc.), and
the ranking between two comonotonic allocations is not reversed by the addition
of a comonotonic allocation.” (Galichon and Henry, 2012; p. 1513). In 2006,
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Duclos et al. showed that it is possible to make sensible comparisons of poverty
when accounts for multiple dimensions of well-being and that multidimensional
comparisons can also differ from univariate comparisons in each individual di-
mension. More recently, Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2012) introduced inframodular
utility functions that represent the attitude of an agent who dislikes transfers
that move mass from inside a multidimensional interval to the sets above and
below it, mimicking the mean preserving spread. Since a function is concave if
and only if it has non-increasing differences, in the same way for multivariate
functions, inframodularity (generalized concavity) implies that there are non-
increasing differences. In this way, Mu¨ller and Scarsini use inframodular func-
tions to model risk aversion that involves substitutable, but not complementary,
commodities.
3 Main motivation
In the unidimensional case, when considering n individuals 1, . . . , j, . . . , n with
incomes x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xj ≤ . . . ≤ xn, it is usually assumed that if xj < xj+1
then a transfer ε > 0 from individual j + 1, to individual j such that xj + ε ≤
xj+1− ε reduces inequality. This transfer is a Pigou-Dalton transfer. Note that
this is equivalent to assuming that if xj ≤ xj+1, then modifying xj into xj − ε
and xj+1 into xj+1 + ε increases inequality.
Thus turning to the m-dimensional case m ≥ 1, which is the topic of this
paper, where each individual j has a column-vector Aj ∈ Rm of m attributes,
we get that the m × n matrix A = (A1, . . . , Aj , . . . , An) summarizes the data.
Imagine that for two individuals their respective column attributes are X and
Y , with X ≤ Y (i.e. xi ≤ yi, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m) and let ε ∈ Rm+ with ε 6= 0. In such
a situation, transfer ε from X to Y will be a regressive Pigou-Dalton transfer
because it would increase inequalities.1
Our goal is to axiomatize additive social evaluation functions, i.e., social
evaluation functions I : A −→ R such that I(A) =
n∑
j=1
u(Aj) where u : Rm −→
R agrees with a diminishing social evaluation in the case of such a Pigou-Dalton
regressive transfer as above. It is immediate that ∀(X,Y ) ∈ Rm×Rm such that
X ≤ Y and ∀ε ≥ 0, u should satisfy:
u(X)− u(X − ε) ≥ u(Y + ε)− u(Y ) (1)
This is the usual property of concavity in the one-dimensionalcase, at least
when u is continuous. Actually, we show (see the Annex ) that inframodu-
lar functions, extensively studied by Marinacci and Montrucchio (2005) and
proposed by Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2001) as a meaningful representation of risk
1Since this paper has been performed, we have been aware of a similar Pigou-Dalton
principle introduced by Bosmans et al. (2009). Nevertheless main differences persist between
the two papers: our definition is model-free and our main motivation is to link this principle
to inframodularity.
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aversion in the multidimensional case, satisfy this desired property (1), and
are consistent with the relevant property of correlation increasing majoriza-
tion. Inframodular functions may not be concave (e.g. Marinacci and Montruc-
chio, 2005); therefore, as observed by Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2001), inframod-
ular functions do not match the property of risk aversion, which states that
adding a random vector E with mean 0 to a constant multivariate vector is
always unfavorable. Note also that multidimensional concave functions may
not be inframodular. A typical example is the three-dimensional HDI function
v : (x1, x2, x3) ∈ [0, 1]3 −→ v(x1, x2, x3) = x
1
3
1 x
1
3
2 x
1
3
3 . Therefore, an additive
social evaluation function based on HDI might not respect the natural multi-
dimensional Pigou-Dalton principle evocated above. As for an example let us
consider two individuals with row attributes respectively X = (0.8, 0.64, 0.729)
and Y = (0.9, 0.81, 0.729) and let us transfer ε = (0, 0, 0.1) from X to Y . A
simple computation delivers v(X − ε) + v(Y + ε) > v(X) + v(Y ).
Indeed, the updated HDI2 denoted v above would not value the two previ-
ous situations as in the former computation, but the ranking would be again
disputable since:
HDI(X,Y ) = v
(
X + Y
2
)
= v
(
X − ε+ Y + ε
2
)
= HDI(X − ε, Y + ε)
As a consequence this index would not take into account what appears as
a clear deterioration of the social function with respect to inequality, when
modifying (X,Y ) into (X − ε, Y + ε).
This contrasts with the additive social evaluation function that we propose
in this paper (e.g. Theorem 3 and Section 8), namely I(X,Y ) = u(X) + u(Y )
where u(x1, x2, x3) = ln
x1 + x2 + x3
3
which delivers,
I(X,Y ) = ln(0.587) > I(X − ε, Y + ε) = ln(0.583)
hence a ranking in accordance with the intuition.
As pointed out in the introduction, we intend to test the pertinence of in-
framodular social evaluations when compared to the famous HDI. This explains
why we will focus on particularly tractable and meaningful inframodular func-
tions u as proposed by Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2001; 2012) through:
u(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xm) = ψ(
m∑
i=1
αixi) (2)
where ψ is concave and α1, . . . , αm ≥ 0.
Note that such an u is a valuable function for our purpose, since, first, it
makes sense to weight the different attributes in accordance with their impor-
tance αi ≥ 0, and second, with such a ψ concave, the resulting u is inframodular,
so it agrees with our definition of increasing inequality.
2In 2010 the HDI functional has changed its additive form to a multiplicative form as men-
tioned above. Section 8 includes a discussion about this ‘new’ HDI. Details are in Zambrano
(2014).
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Accordingly, in this paper, we mainly axiomatize the social evaluation func-
tion of the type given by (2), present the natural usual axioms aiming to specify
ψ, and propose a simple relative inequality index. Moreover, as pointed out in
the Introduction, our social evaluation functions is proved to satisfy the condi-
tion of correlation increasing majorization.
4 Framework and axioms
We consider n individuals 1, . . . , j, . . . , n and Aj ∈ Rm is the column-vector
of the m attributes of this individual Aj =

a1j
.
aij
.
amj
; indeed, the same m
attributes are considered for each individual.3
Henceforth, for n given individuals, A = (A1, . . . , Aj , . . . , An) is the m × n
matrix summarizing the considered population.
A denotes the set of real matrices. If aij ≥ 0 ∀i and ∀j, we use the notation
A+, and if aij > 0 ∀i and ∀j, we use the notation A++.
Thus % is a preference relation on A (if A+ or A++ is used, this is specified
in the Theorems). Here, we present the version of the axioms for A. Indeed, for
A,B ∈ A , A % B means A is weakly preferred to B, etc.
Then % is supposed to express the preferences of the policy-maker or the
modeler for global welfare, taking into account that inequalities have a bad
impact on welfare, but also that all attributes are ‘positive’; that is, any increase
in some attribute has a positive effect on welfare.
The first three axioms are standard; therefore, they do not require a partic-
ular explanation:
A.1 % is a weak order; i.e., % is a transitive, complete hence reflexive binary
relation on A.
A.2 Continuity : LetB ∈ A be given, then {A ∈ A|A % B} and {A ∈ A|A  B}
is closed in the usual topology of Rn×m.
A.3 Monotonicity : ∀A,B ∈ A, aij ≥ bij ∀i, j, implies A % B; if furthermore
A 6= B, then A  B.
For A ∈ A and A′j a column of Rm, (A
′
j , A−j) denotes the matrix A where
column Aj has been replaced by column A
′
j . Thus, the classical independence
axiom that states that the impact for the ranking of replacing a given individual
by another one is the same if all the other individuals remain unchanged.
A.4 Independence: ∀j and ∀A,B (Aj , A−j) %
(
A
′
j , A−j
)
⇐⇒ (Aj , B−j) %(
A
′
j , B−j
)
.
Below is the classical anonymity index that states that the value of a distri-
bution does not depend on the identity; only the value of the attributes matters.
3Note that throughout the paper we assume n ≥ 3.
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A.5 Anonymity : for any permutation matrix Π and for all A ∈ A, one
has A ∼ ΠA; i.e., (A1, . . . , Aj , . . . , An) ∼
(
Aσ(1), . . . , Aσ(j), . . . , Aσ(n)
)
where
σ : [1, n]→ [1, n] is a bijection.
The last two axioms, to the best of our knowledge, are new and are crucial
for our purpose.
Roughly speaking, the additivity axiom states that if an individual with a
given vector of attributes is indifferent between two different lists of attributes
for the others, he remains indifferent if he is endowed with a new vector of
attributes.
A.6 Additivity : ∀A,Aj , Bj , Cj , (Aj , A−j) ∼ (Bj , A−j) =⇒ (Aj+Cj , A−j) ∼
(Bj + Cj , A−j).
The following Pigou-Dalton principle is the direct translation of the fact that
if for an individual (j1) all the attributes are smaller than for another one (j2),
then transferring for any i a value εi ≥ 0 of attribute i from j1 to j2 clearly
should increase the inequality (strictly increase if some εi > 0), thus leading to
a worse situation.
A.7 Pigou-Dalton principle: Let A = (A1, . . . , Aj , . . . , An) such that for
some j1, j2 one has Aj1 ≤ Aj2 and let ε ∈ Rm+ then:
Aε =
(
A1, . . . , Aj1−1 , Aj1 − ε,Aj1+1 , . . . , Aj2−1 , Aj2 + ε,Aj2+1 , . . . , An
)
- A;
furthermore, Aε ≺ A if ε ≥ 0 but ε 6= 0.
5 Multidimensional social evaluation functions
In this Section, multidimensional social evaluation functions are defined and
characterized. Theorem 1 offers axiomatization of the additive social evaluation
function.
Theorem 1 A preference relation % on A satisfies A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5 if
and only if there exists: u : Rm −→ R increasing and continuous satisfying (1),
such that:
∀A,B ∈ A, A % B ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
u(Aj) ≥
n∑
j=1
u(Bj)
where u is defined up to a positive affine transformation (the proof is in the
Appendix).
We come now to the main result of this paper in which we characterize
social evaluation functions built upon the special type of inframodular functions
satisfying (2) as proposed in a different framework by Mu¨ller and Scarsini. Such
a social function agrees with our Pigou-Dalton principle A.7 and with the
property of correlation increasing majorization as shown in Section 7.
Theorem 2 A preference relation on A satisfies A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6
and A.7 if and only if there exist αi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, such that
m∑
i=1
αi = 1 and
7
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there exists ψ : R→ R strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuous such
that:
A % B ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
ψ(
m∑
i=1
αi · aij) ≥
n∑
j=1
ψ(
m∑
i=1
αi · bij).
Furthermore, such α′is are unique and ψ is defined up to an increasing affine
transformation.
Proof. The necessary part of the proof is straightforward since inframodular
functions satisfy A.7 (see Lemma 1 in the Annex ); thus we confine ourselves
to proving the sufficiency part of the proof. From Theorem 1, we already know
that the preference relations j on Rm of every individual j are identical.
Let us denote
∗
% this common preference relation and let us show that there
exists αi > 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, which
m∑
i=1
αi = 1 such that ∀(X,Y ) ∈ Rm × Rm,
X
∗
% Y ⇐⇒
m∑
i=1
αixi ≥
m∑
i=1
αiyi.
Moreover, A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 imply that
∗
% satisfies:
A*.1 :
∗
% is a weak order;
A*.2 : continuity: X(p), X, Y ∈ Rm then:
A*.2.1 : X(p)
∗
% Y , ∀p, X(p) ↓ X =⇒ X
∗
% Y
A*.2.2 : X(p)
∗
- Y, ∀p, X(p) ↑ X =⇒ X
∗
- Y
A*.3 : monotonicity: X,Y ∈ Rm, X ≥ Y =⇒ X
∗
& Y , furthermore
if X 6= Y =⇒ X ∗ Y
A*.4 : additivity: ∀X,Y, Z ∈ Rm, X ∗∼ Y =⇒ X + Z ∗∼ Y + Z
For X ∈ Rm denote I(X) : ≡ Inf
{
xR x · 1
∗
% X
}
, it is easy to see that
I(X) exists in R, that X
∗
% Y if and only if I(X) ≥ I(Y ) and that I(x · 1) = x,
∀x ∈ R, where indeed 1 =

1
.
.
.
1
 ∈ Rm
Let ei be the ith vector of the canonical basis of Rm, i.e., ei =

0
.
1
.
0
 the
ith row, and let αi :≡ I(ei), from A*.3, since I(0) = 0, one gets αi > 0.
We now intend to show that
8
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(3) I(X) =
m∑
i=1
αixi
Note that since I(1) = 1 this will entail
m∑
i=1
αi = 1.
In order to prove (3), let us show first that: ∀Y,Z ∈ Rm one has
(4) I(Y + Z) = I(Y ) + I(Z)
Since Y
∗∼ I(Y )·1 and Z ∗∼ I(Z)·1 A*.4 implies (4), since Y+Z ∗∼ I(Y )·1+Z
and I(Y ) · 1 + Z ∗∼ (I(Y ) + I(Z)) · 1, gives Y + Z ∗∼ (I(Y ) + I(Z)) · 1
It turns out that I(X) =
m∑
i=1
I(xi · ei). It remains to show that I(xi · ei) =
xiI(ei).
It is enough to prove that.
(5) I(x ·X) = x · I(X) ∀x ∈ R and ∀X ∈ Rm.
This has been already proved for x = 0. So let us assume x ∈ R∗.
Assume first x ∈ Q∗ i.e. x = p
q
, p ∈ N∗, q ∈ Z∗.
From (4) I(
p
q
·X) = I(p · X
q
) = p · I(X
q
) but I(X) = I(q · X
q
) = q · I(X
q
)
Therefore, I(
p
q
·X) = p
q
· I(X).
From A*.2 it is simple to see that Xn ↓ X =⇒ I( Xn) ↓ I(X) and
Xn ↑ X =⇒ I( Xn) ↑ I(X), and that I is monotone i.e. X ≥ Y =⇒ I(X) ≥
I(Y ).
So let us consider now x ∈ R and xn ∈ Q, xn ↓ x, yn ∈ Q, yn ↑ x, from A*.3
xn ·X ≥ x ·X ≥ yn ·X implies:
xn ·X
∗
% x ·X
∗
% yn ·X so I(xn ·X) ≥ I(x ·X) ≥ I(yn ·X)
Therefore, xn · I(X) ≥ I(x ·X) ≥ yn · I(X) ∀n, so letting n −→ +∞,
we get I(x ·X) = x · I(X), which completes the fact that:
X
∗
% Y if and only if
m∑
i=1
αixi ≥
m∑
i=1
αiyi.
We end the proof by showing that up to an increasing affine transforma-
tion there exists a unique ψ : R → R strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
continuous such that ∀A,B ∈ A :
A % B ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
ψ(
m∑
i=1
αi · aij) ≥
n∑
j=1
ψ(
m∑
i=1
αi · bij).
From Theorem 1 there exists - up to a positive affine transformation - a
unique u increasing and continuous satisfying (1) such that:
X,Y ∈ Rm, X
∗
% Y ⇐⇒ u(X) ≥ u(Y ).
Since I : Rm → R is also a strictly increasing and continuous representation
of
∗
%, there exists up to a positive affine transformation a strictly increasing
continuous function ψ : R→ R such that u = ψ ◦ I.
It remains to be proved that ψ is strictly concave.
It is enough to show that ∀(a, b) ∈ R2, a ≤ b, ∀ε > 0 one has ψ(a)−ψ(a−ε) >
ψ(b+ ε)− ψ(b).
It is immediate to find X,Y ∈ Rm such that X ≤ Y and
9
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m∑
i=1
αixi = a, b =
m∑
i=1
αiyi, so from A.7, we get
u(X)− u(X − ε1) > u(Y + ε1)− u(Y )
Therefore, ψ(a)− ψ(a− ε) > ψ(b+ ε)− ψ(b), which completes the proof of
Theorem 2
6 Specification of ψ and a relative inequality in-
dex
To specify ψ, we introduce two axioms that have a long tradition; see, for
instance, Kolm (1976a;b) and, more recently, Gajdos and Weymark (2005).
A.8 ∀A,B ∈ A and ∀λ ∈ R, A ∼ B ⇐⇒ A+ λ1 ∼ B + λ1 where 1 is the
matrix m× n with 1 everywhere.
This axiom quoted as a ‘leftist’ point of view by Kolm regarding inequalities
expresses that the inequalities remain unchanged if the same amount is added
to all attributes and to all individuals.
The following axiom quoted as a ‘centrist’ point of view by Kolm regarding
inequalities, and that applies only if all the attributes are strictly positive, i.e.,
A ∈ A++, expresses that inequalities remain unchanged if all attributes are
multiplied by the same positive number λ > 0 for all individuals.
A.9 ∀A,B ∈ A++ and ∀λ > 0, A ∼ B ⇐⇒ λA ∼ λB
Theorem 3 Assume that the preference relation % on A satisfies A.1 to A.7,
then:
· up to an increasing affine transformation ψ(t) = −e−at with a > 0 if and
only if A.8 is satisfied;
· up to an increasing affine transformation either ψ(t) = ln(t), ∀t > 0 or
ψ(t) = ta, ∀t > 0 where a 6= 0, a < 1 if and only if A.9 is satisfied.
Proof. We prove only the if part ; the only if part is straightforward.
Assume A.8 is satisfied. It is easy to see that if
n∑
j=1
ψ(xj) =
n∑
j=1
ψ(yj) where
xj , yj ∈ R, we must have
n∑
j=1
ψ(xj + k) =
n∑
j=1
ψ(yj + k) ∀k ∈ R, and then we
can apply the results of the classical one-dimensional social welfare theory (see
e.g. Kolm, 1976a) to get the desired result.
Assume A.9 is satisfied. It is easy to see that
n∑
j=1
ψ(xj) =
n∑
j=1
ψ(yj) where
xj > 0, yj > 0, ∀j implies
n∑
j=1
ψ(λxj) =
n∑
j=1
ψ(λyj) ∀λ > 0, and then we can
apply the results of the classical one-dimensional social welfare theory4
4See e.g. Kolm (1976a;b) or Atkinson (1970) to get the result
10
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Remark Note that in cases in which all attributes are strictly positive, and
if we adopt axiom A.9 then ∀A ∈ A++ one could adopt the social evaluation
function J(A) =
n∏
j=1
(
m∑
i=1
αi · aij).
Indeed, in such a case: I(A) =
n∑
j=1
ln(
m∑
i=1
αi · aij) = ln(
n∏
j=1
(
m∑
i=1
αi · aij)).
We focus on the relative inequality index that is linked with the choice of
ψ(.) = ln(.). This index appears to be one of the most tractable and relevant in
our framework.
6.1 Corollary of Theorem 3
The corresponding inequality index related to the social evaluation function
defined on A++, the set of m×n matrices with positive elements, satisfying A.1
to A.7 and A.9 with ψ(t) = ln(t), with t > 0 is relative and has the form
1−
 n∏
j=1
m∑
i=1
αi·aij
m∑
i=1
αi·µi
 1n
Where µi, i = 1, . . . ,m, is the mean of i
th attribute.
Proof. Following Tsui (1995) and Kolm (1977), let us define the multidi-
mensional inequality index IR(A) for A ∈ A++ as IR(A) = 1 − δ(A) where
δ(A) ∈ [0, 1] is defined by I(A) = I (δ(A) ·Aµ)
where Aµ is the m × n matrix where each column writes

µ1
.
µi
.
µm
. From
I(A) =
n∑
j=1
ln(
m∑
i=1
αi·aij) = ln
n∏
j=1
(
m∑
i=1
αi·aij) and I(δ(A)) = ln
(
δ(A)n ·
(
m∑
i=1
αi · µi
)n)
one gets the desired result, namely, IR(A) = 1−
 n∏
j=1
m∑
i=1
αi·aij
m∑
i=1
αi·µi
 1n
7 Agreeing with correlation increasing majoriza-
tion.
Correlation increasing majorization (CIM ) is a concept due to Boland and
Proschan (1988) and introduced into the inequality literature by Tsui (1999). As
pointed out by Tsui (1999), this type of majorization is known as an ordering of
dependence in statistics (e.g. Shaked, 1982) and in economics of risks as ‘pairwise
more risk’ (Richard, 1975). Note that CIM or the majorization axiom corre-
sponds to Atkinson-Bourguignon ordering (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1982),
but Gajdos and Weymark (2005) observed that Bourguignon and Chakravarty
(2003) raised reservations about this axiom, because CIM does not take into
11
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account individual preferences. Since the point of view of our social evaluation
is to consider a policy-maker or else a modeler who aims to consider each in-
dividual in the same way, we do not concur with the previous reservation and
agree with the motivating examples given by Tsui in 1999.
Let A,B,C be the following three matrices summarizing the distributions
of attributes,5
A =
 1 2 32 3 1
3 2 1
 B =
 1 2 31 3 2
1 2 3
 C =
 1 2 31 2 3
1 2 3

Similar to Tsui (1999), we feel intuitively compelled to agree that the distri-
bution of attributes summarized by C is most unequal followed by B and then
by A.
Note that column B1 and B3 are nothing other than B1 = A1 ∧ A3 and
B3 = A1 ∨A3, where ∧ and ∨ are the classical operators min and max.
Furthermore, C2 = B2 ∧B3 and C3 = B2 ∨B3.
It is time to define formally correlation increasing majorization.
First, let us introduce some definitions (see Boland and Proschan, 1988).
Concept of correlation increasing transfer (CIT )
Let A,B ∈ A, then B is obtained from A by a CIT if there exists j1, j2,
j1 6= j2 such that Bj1 = Aj1 ∧Aj2 and Bj2 = Aj1 ∨Aj2
A CIT is strict whenever neither Aj1 ≤ Aj2 nor Aj2 ≤ Aj1.
Concept of correlation increasing majorization (CIM )
Let A,B ∈ A, then A >c B; i.e., A is strictly less unequal for the CIM if B
may be derived from A by a permutation of columns and a finite sequence of
the correlation increasing transfers at least one of which is strict.
We can now state and prove that our social evaluation functional of Theorem
2 as well as any strict inframodular social functional of Theorem 1 respect CIM.
We say that an inframodular function u is strict if:
∀(X,Y ) ∈ Rm × Rm, X < Y , i.e., X ≤ Y, X 6= Y and ε ≥ 0, ε ∈ Rm,
ε 6= 0,
one has u(X + ε)− u(X) > u(Y + ε)− u(Y )
Note this is the case for the inframodular function in Theorem 2.
Theorem 4 Any strict inframodular social evaluation functional respects CIM.
Proof. It is enough to prove that if A1 and A2 are two columns in Rm, and
neither A1 ≤ A2 nor A2 ≤ A1, then the inframodular function u satisfies u(A1)+
u(A2) > u(A1 ∧A2) + u(A1 ∨A2).
The proof is in the Annex
Remark CIM and multidimensional majorization
5Each column represents an individual.
12
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It is worth noticing that the type of reduction of inequality or in other words
of majorization envisioned in this paper is different from the usual multidimen-
sional majorization. Actually, this feature is particularly clear when considering
CIM (as observed by Zoli, 2009). Consider distributions A and B such that
A =
(
0 1
1 0
)
B =
(
0 1
0 1
)
, clearly A >c B,
but one cannot find any bistochastic matrix Π =
(
λ 1− λ
1− λ λ
)
such
that ΠB = A.
The reader will find in Mu¨ller and Scarsini (2012) an extensive study of the
sequence of inframodular transfers, which correspond to our type of majoriza-
tion. This is performed in the case of general multidimensional probability
measures. It would be interesting to derive the corresponding transfers in our
simpler framework. This will be the subject of a future paper.
8 Empirical Analysis
Based on Theorem 3, we specialize ψ(·) as ψ(·) = ln(·), thus, considering cases
in which all of the attributes are strictly positive we adopt ∀A ∈ A++ as a
‘mean’ social evaluation function,
J(A) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ln
m∑
i=1
αiaij
We aim at evaluating the pertinence of this inframodular function using data.
In order to test it, we decided to make a comparison with another function that
is not inframodular, namely the famous Human Development Index (HDI). This
index was launched by United Nations in 1990.6 The classical version of this
index basically works with three variables (life expectancy (h), education (e)
and income (w)) and provides a value, which allows to obtain ranking among
countries. Recently, in 2010, this index has been updated7 and now its form is,
H(h, e, w) = h
1
3 e
1
3w
1
3
where each variable is an index between 0 and 1 and consists, basically, in
the population mean, for example, h = 1n
n∑
j=1
hj .
Besides the famous role of HDI, we can simply consider this index as a way
to aggregate different attributes, as well. As H(h, e, w) provides an outcome
between 0 and 1, we decided to extract the ‘certainty equivalent’ of J(A), i.e.,
I(A) = expJ(A). Then, now we have both indexes providing results in the range
[0, 1].
6For more details, see UNDP (1990).
7Zambrano (2014) has a discussion about this new index, its computation and axiomati-
zation. See also Herrero et al. (2010).
13
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The database chosen is the Brazilian national exam for high school students.8
The final notes in this exam are split up in five categories: natural sciences,
human sciences, languages, mathematics and essay writing. In order to apply
H(·) in these data, we focused our analysis in only three attributes, namely,
natural sciences (as), languages (al) and mathematics (am).
The population (n) is the number of students in each town. Following HDI
rules, here we also give the same weight to the attributes. The function J(A)
in this case, writes as,
J(A) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
ln
(
asj + a
l
j + a
m
j
3
)
It is widely known that classical HDI formula does not consider in its cal-
culation the level of inequality within a country. For this, a specific index is
available called IHDI.9 However, we are interested in contrast with the classi-
cal HDI to detect in which extent I(A) is influenced by the ‘intra’ inequalities.
In other words, we want to see whether this function delivers a worst result
for towns which have more inequality among their students. In this case, as
the classical HDI neglects inequality characteristics, this comparison could be a
good option to test the effectiveness of this function with respect to inequality.
Once Brazil has 5570 towns, then we confined our analysis to Minas Gerais
state. Below the descriptive statistics are presented.
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Science 0.49611 0.07456 0.34200 0.87640
Language 0.51850 0.06725 0.30620 0.79440
Math 0.49559 0.11077 0.31850 0.97360
Number of Students 677,127
Results by Town
Function Mean
Standard
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
I(A) 0.48412 0,01851 0,43577 0,53025
H(A) 0.48765 0.01913 0.43748 0.53450
Number of Towns 853
Firstly, the difference between the I(A) and H(A) outcomes is relatively
small. Their correlation coefficient is 0, 999. The similarity of the outcomes is
8This exam is called ENEM (Exame Nacional do Ensino Me´dio – National high school
exam). This exam is non-mandatory and has been used both as an admission test for enroll-
ment in federal universities and educational institutes, as well as for certification for a high
school degree.
9Kovacevic (2010) offers a good review and discussion about the importance of the inequal-
ity to evaluate the human development.
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suitable, because it shows that this function provides the outcomes in a similar
sense as HDI usually does. Nevertheless, we may see through the descriptive
statistics table that there are some differences between both functions’ results
and we are interested in them.
For example, despite the strong closeness among the outcomes, we found
that H(A) is always bigger than I(A) for every town, and this difference varies.
Thus, since HDI does not consider inequality in its computation, we would
like to know if the size of the difference between the functions is related with
inequality level of the towns. In other words, we want to see whether inequality
is positively correlated with H(A) − I(A). To measure the inequality in this
case, we summed the values of the attributes for each student and extracted the
standard deviation of this transformed variable. We want to analyze the relation
between these two variables in order to assert whether I(A) takes inequality into
account or not.
To answer this question, we need to evaluate these variables jointly. Below
in Figure 1, one will find the dispersion graph of these two variables.
HDI - I(A)= 0,0382GSD - 0,0035 
R² = 0,9776 
0,001
0,002
0,003
0,004
0,005
0,006
0,007
0,1 0,12 0,14 0,16 0,18 0,2 0,22 0,24
H
(A
) 
- 
I(
A
) 
Global Standard Deviation 
Figure 1: Dispersion graph between H(A)−I(A) and the global standard
deviation of the attributes
We, also, computed a linear regression as a hypothetical exercise. The equa-
tion is written in the graph and depicted by the black line. The value of R2
attests that standard deviation explains almost 98% of the H(A)− I(A) behav-
ior. The positive relation between the variables is quite substantial.
Therefore, based on these results we suggest that this function could be a
good alternative to IHDI. In short, we provide an inframodular function which
can be used to aggregate several attributes (with different weights, if necessary),
and takes into account the inequality inside the analyzed ‘population’.
15
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9 Concluding remarks
This paper aimed at characterizing a simple ‘additive’ social evaluation func-
tion based on a particular type of inframodular function proposed by Mu¨ller
and Scarsini. In the multidimensional case it allows to respect what can be
considered a natural Pigou-Dalton principle. Furthermore, if the policy-maker
aims at treating every individual equally, which might be fair, our social evalu-
ation functions agree with the property of correlation increasing majorization,
already suggested by Tsui.
Building upon a long tradition, we specify our functions in order to obtain
a simple tractable relative inequality index. Finally we propose an empirical
analysis aiming at evaluating the pertinence of a specific inframodular evaluation
function a` la Mu¨ller and Scarsini, when compared to the famous HDI functional.
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10 Annex
Marinacci and Montrucchio (2005) provided a through analysis of ‘ultramodular
functions’, thus (by reversing the inequality in the definition) of what Mu¨ller
and Scarsini (2012) called ‘inframodular functions’.
Definition A function f : Rn → R is said to be inframodular if its incre-
ments are decreasing, namely:
(6) f(x+ h)− f(x) ≥ f(y + h)− f(y)
for all x, y ∈ Rn with x ≤ y and h ∈ Rn, h ≥ 0
We intend now to prove that inframodular functions agree with our Pigou-
Dalton regressive transfers (see Introduction).
Lemma 1 if f : Rn → R is inframodular then f satisfies Property 7 below:
(7) f(x)− f(x− h) ≥ f(y + h)− f(y)
for all x, y ∈ Rn with x ≤ y and h ∈ Rn, h ≥ 0
Proof. Let x, y ∈ Rn x ≤ y and h ≥ 0. Set x′ = x − h and y′ = y, h′ = h so
x′ ≤ y′ and h′ ≥ 0, therefore
(6) =⇒ f(x′ + h)− f(x′) ≥ f(y′ + h)− f(y′)
i.e. f(x)− f(x− h) ≥ f(y + h)− f(y)
Lemma 2 (Proof of Theorem 4)
First, it is known that if f is inframodular, then f is submodular, i.e.,
∀a, b ∈ Rm f(a) + f(b) ≥ f(a ∧ b) + f(a ∨ b) (see e.g. Marinacci and
Montrucchio, 2005).
Let us show it again for sake of completeness.
Let x = a ∧ b, so a = a ∧ b+ h with h ≥ 0.
Let y = b one has x ≤ y and h ≥ 0 so f inframodular implies
f(x+ h)− f(x) ≥ f(y + h)− f(y)
f(a)− f(a ∧ b) ≥ f(b+ a− a ∧ b)− f(b)
but b+ a− a ∧ b = a ∨ b; hence, the result:
f(a) + f(b) ≥ f(a ∧ b) + f(a ∨ b).
Thus one has u(A1) + u(A2) ≥ u(A1 ∨A2) + u(A1 ∧A2)
Since by hypothesis neither A1 ≤ A2 nor A2 ≤ A1, u strict inframodular
implies u(A1) + u(A2) > u(A1 ∨A2) + u(A1 ∧A2)
Actually since not A2 ≤ A1, we get A1 ∧ A2 < A2 so letting x = A1 ∧ A2,
y = A2, ξ = A1 − A1 ∧A2, we get:
18
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u(x+ξ)+u(y) > u(y+ξ)+u(x) i.e. u(A1)+u(A2) > u(A1∨A2)+u(A1∧A2).

11 Appendix
Theorem 1
Proof. We discuss only the sufficiency part, since the necessary proof is imme-
diate.
From A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 (weak order, continuity, monotonicity and inde-
pendence) and n ≥ 3, Theorem 3 in Debreu (1960) implies that there exist
n increasing and continuous functions uj : Rm −→ R such that A % B ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
uj(Aj) ≥
n∑
j=1
uj(Bj) where the uj are unique up to affine transformation
αuj +βj with α > 0 and βj ∈ R. Thus, we can assume that ∀j uj(0) = 0. From
A.5 (anonymity), let us see that we can assume that there exists u : Rm −→ R,
increasing and continuous such that: A % B ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
u(Aj) ≥
n∑
j=1
u(Bj). So, fix
the uj such that uj(0) = 0 ∀j. By symmetry, we just need to prove that u1 = u2.
Take any A1 ∈ Rm and consider (A1, 0, A3, . . . , An) and (0, A1, A3, . . . , An).
Through A.5 : u1(A1) + u2(0) +
n∑
j=3
uj(Aj) = u1(0) + u2(A1) +
n∑
j=3
uj(Aj), this
entails straightforwardly u1(A1) = u2(A1); thus, u1 = u2 = . . . = un = u. So
there exists u : Rm −→ R increasing continuous (satisfying uj(0) = 0) such that
A % B ⇐⇒
n∑
j=1
u(Aj) ≥
n∑
j=1
u(Bj). Clearly, u is defined up to a positive affine
transformation
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